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Abstract.  The  German  schooling  system  selects  children  into  different  secondary  school 
tracks already at a very early stage in life. School track choice heavily influences choices and 
opportunities later in life. It has often been observed that secondary schooling achievements 
display a strong correlation with parental income. We use sibling fixed effects models and 
information on a natural experiment in order to analyze whether this correlation is due to a 
causal effect of income or due to unobservable factors that themselves might be correlated 
across generations. Our main findings suggest that income has no positive causal effect on 
school choice and that differences between high- and low-income households are driven by 
unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. differences in motivation or preferences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to inequality-related or relative concepts of poverty, child poverty rates increased 
considerably  in  Germany  during  the  last  couple  of  years  (CORAK  ET  AL.  (2005)).  Public 
attention  in  child  poverty  was  additionally  boosted  by  the  reforms  of  the  social  security 
system between 2003 and 2005 ('Hartz' reforms). Many commentators claimed that the only 
conceivable  outcome  of  this  set  of  reforms  could  be  increased  poverty.  Among  the 
detrimental consequences that could arise from an exacerbation of the income situation of 
children and their families are lower educational attainments. At first glance, these concerns 
are supported by the facts, since the association between income and educational attainment is 
well documented. While many studies analyzing this association focus on either test scores or 
highest  school  attainment  (HAVEMAN  and  WOLFE  (1995)  and  MAYER  (2002)  provide  a 
general overview on empirical findings), this paper focuses on secondary school track choice, 
and aims at uncovering causal mechanisms.  
 
Within the German educational system children are sorted to three different school tracks 
preparing for either academic or more technically oriented job profiles. This sorting takes 
place at a very early stage, generally after primary school when children are between 10 and 
12 years old, and has long lasting effects on later labour market and earnings perspectives 
(DUSTMANN (2004)). Thus, school track choice is important because it is highly correlated 
with choices  and opportunities later in life. Although sorting is supposed to be based on 
achievements during primary school and expected outcomes later on, it is also likely to be 
influenced by parental background. DUSTMANN (2004), for example, shows that track choice 
of children is highly correlated with educational attainment of the parents. BÜCHEL ET  AL. 
(2001), JENKINS and SCHLUTER (2002), as well as SCHNEIDER (2004) show that children from 
poor  households  generally  choose  lower  level  tracks.  Yet  these  studies  leave  open  the 
question, whether choices differ due to heterogeneity in the level of ability of children from 
different families or whether these choices are causally affected by parental background and 
family income.  
 
Why should we expect income to have any causal effect on school track choice? BECKER and 
TOMES  (1979,  1986)  argue  that  parents  invest  in  children,  e.g.  in  schooling,  in  order  to 
maximize their own utility. Parental utility is affected by children's outcomes because parents 
receive part of children's income later on or because parents benefit from child well-being, i.e. 
they  are  altruistic.  In  this  model,  investment  in  children's  education  is  optimal  when  the 
marginal  rate  of  return  to  education  equals  the  rate  of  return  to  other  investments.  In 
equilibrium, optimal investment in education is independent of parental income if parents 
have access to perfect capital markets. Thus, an effect from income to school choice exists, if 
capital  markets  are  not  perfect  and  parental  budgets  are  constrained.  Although  there  is 
generally no fee for secondary schooling in Germany, direct costs might still differ between 
school  tracks.  This  might  be  due  to  costs  associated  with  school  attendance,  e.g. 
transportation costs. In some, mostly rural areas, higher track schools are less numerous than 
lower track schools and thus transportation is more costly and time consuming. Also, parents 
might  take  into  account  expected  costs  for  additional  private  lessons,  if  children  do  not 
succeed in higher track schools. A second reason for a causal impact of household income on 
school  choice  exists,  if  discount  rates  for  future  earnings  or  the  level  of  altruism  differs 
between  households  due  to  differences  in  the  level  of  parental  income.  In  this  case,  the 
opportunity cost of not working will differ for otherwise identical children. Since the number 
of years until completion of schooling differs between tracks and is shorter in lower ranked 
tracks, poor households might be more likely to send children to lower ranked tracks, which   - 3 - 
basically prepare children for taking up apprenticeship or any other work at age 16, when 
compulsory school attendance ends. 
 
Other reasons for income having a causal effect on school choice are that low income might 
cause emotional stress among parents (see MCLOYD (1990)). This in turn might lead to lower 
parenting quality, i.e. the parents are less supportive, consistent and involved, and thus have 
adverse effects on child attainments, e.g. during primary school where expectations on future 
success  are  formed.  Consequently,  teachers  are  more  likely  to  recommend  lower  ranked 
tracks. Finally, in a few cases severe poverty can also lead to a reduction in food availability, 
e.g. lack of a daily breakfast, which in turn might lead to reduced child attainments in primary 
school, as well.  
 
Apart  from  any  causal  effects,  however,  there  are  several  other  reasons  why  income  and 
school choice are correlated. First of all, it is likely that parents with high income also have 
higher education, reflecting differences in ability that might be passed on to the child. In 
principle, the empirical analysis will be able to account for parental education and any other 
observable household characteristics. Yet, in addition there might be unobservable factors that 
are transmitted from parents to children, for example motivation or aspects of ability that are 
not reflected in parental education. Also, since higher schooling is generally associated with 
higher  earnings  later  on,  high-income  parents  might  aspire  that  their  children  earn  high 
incomes as well, i.e. parental preferences differ. Furthermore there might exist social relations 
and pressure from peer groups which influence parental decisions on children and make some 
parents more likely to choose higher-level tracks for their offspring than others. Or parental 
abilities to care for children differ, i.e. high income parents might simply be better parents. 
 
Existing studies on parental income and school track choice in Germany generally support the 
hypothesis that income is positively associated with choosing higher tracks. BÜCHEL ET AL. 
(2001) find that children in the highest income quintile display significantly higher rates of 
attendance  of  the  highest  track,  even  when  controlling  for  other  parental  background 
characteristics. Poor children, however, do not differ from children with intermediate income. 
SCHNEIDER (2004) finds that the coefficient of the income variable differs across the income 
distribution. For those with median income, increases in income are positively associated with 
attending the highest track, while increases in income seem to play no significant role for 
those at the higher and lower end of the income distribution. Finally, JENKINS and SCHLUTER 
(2002) show that higher income is positively correlated with attending higher tracks and that 
income  during  late  childhood  matters  more  than  during  early  childhood.  Their  findings 
suggest that the association between income and track choice is linear.  
 
All existing studies for Germany have in common that they rely on regression-based methods 
controlling  only  for  a  modest  set  of  family  related  and  demographic  characteristics. 
Consequently, the estimated effect of income might be spurious, due to omission of several 
other  (often  unobservable)  factors  that  might  be  associated  with  differences  in  household 
income and track choice. This paper tries to identify the causal effect of income by applying 
sibling fixed effects models comparing track choices of siblings who were sorted to tracks 
under  different  financial  circumstances.  Furthermore,  we  use  information  on  a  natural 
experiment leading to exogenous variation in household incomes, i.e. we compare children 
choosing school tracks before and after the reform of the child benefit system in 1996. Our 
main findings suggest that income has no positive causal effect on school choice and that 
differences  between  high-  and  low-income  households  are  predominantly  driven  by 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
   - 4 - 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we shortly provide 
information on the secondary schooling system in Germany. We also show that track choice 
has considerable influence on other outcomes later in life. In the ensuing section we present 
the data and our econometric models. Results are presented in section 4 and conclusions are 
provided in the last section. 
 
 
2. Institutional Background 
 
In  Germany,  secondary  education  is  compulsory  and  generally  provided  free  of  charge. 
Traditionally, there are three school tracks which prepare children for different job profiles. 
Hauptschule, which is regarded as the lowest secondary school track, provides basic general 
education and some applied labour market skills; it mainly prepares for blue-collar work. 
Realschule provides a more extensive general education and applied skills relevant for white-
collar work. Realschule is regarded as intermediate track. Finally, Gymnasium is regarded as 
highest track, because it provides in-depth general education preparing for academic careers. 
Children succeeding in Gymnasium obtain an upper secondary school degree (Abitur) which 
is the official university entrance level.
1  
 
Since education is regulated on the state level (Länder) there are some differences concerning 
this clear-cut division of tracks. In some Länder the lowest and the intermediate track are 
linked together more closely than in others. Furthermore, regulations differ on the timing of 
separation  of  children  between  tracks.  In  the  majority  of  Länder  children  are  sorted  to 
secondary school tracks after fourth grade when children are about 10 years old. In other 
Länder, however, children are sorted after sixth grade when they are age 12. Track choice 
after primary school is influenced by a recommendation of teachers in primary school, mainly 
based on performance during primary school, and the final decision of the parents. In some 
Länder, parents can choose secondary school track quite freely without having to adhere to 
teacher recommendations, in others the child has to pass additional entrance tests if parents 
decide for higher level tracks than those recommended by teachers (KMK (2006)). 
 
After initial sorting, changing from one track to the other is generally possible; however, the 
majority of children do not change tracks. Evidence for this is provided in SCHNEPF (2002) 
and in table 1, where we juxtapose school track attended at age 14 with highest schooling 
degree at age 21. For West German youths born between 1970 and 1984, we find that 67% of 
those attending the lowest school track at age 14 earn a degree from Hauptschule (secondary 
general school degree) as highest schooling degree, 61% of those attending Realschule hold 
an intermediate degree which is the degree obtained after finishing Realschule, and 66% of 
those attending Gymnasium manage to obtain upper secondary school degree, i.e. university 
entrance certificate. Some 21% of those attending Realschule at age 14 and a mere 5% of 
those  attending  Hauptschule  manage  to  earn  an  upper  secondary  school  degree  or  a 
commercial/technical school degree, which also provides access to university. Furthermore, 
approximately 10% of each track drop out of school without holding a degree or still attend 
school at age 21. 
                                                 
1 Apart from these three school tracks there also exist comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen). These are left 
out of the analysis, because there is no unambiguous ranking  with the other tracks in terms of educational 
requirements and prestige of final degree. In our sample 7.5% of children in West Germany attend this type of 
school. Furthermore, there are commercial and technical high schools which impart advanced knowledge and 
award a degree, which provides restricted access to universities. Children attend commercial and technical high 
schools after finishing Hauptschule or Realschule. They are left out of the analysis because children do not 
attend these school types at age 14, which is the age we focus on.   - 5 - 
 
DUSTMANN (2004) shows that different school-leaving certificates are followed by different 
post-secondary educational choices and translate into large wage differentials later in life. 
More specifically, for West German birth cohorts 1920 to 1956 he finds that the majority of 
men  holding  a  general  secondary  degree  went  for  blue-collar  apprenticeship  training 
afterwards,  the  majority  of  men  with  an  intermediate  degree  went  for  white-collar 
apprenticeship training or attended a vocational school, and the majority of those with upper 
secondary degree attended university. For women results are similar. However, women with 
general secondary degree often favoured no further training or attending vocational school 
over blue-collar apprenticeship training. Analyzing entry wages of those entering the labour 
market between 1984 and 1990, DUSTMANN (2004) also shows that, controlling for age and 
cohort, individuals with an intermediate school degree earn 21-33% more than those with a 
general  school  degree  (16-27%  if  further  vocational  training  or  university  degree  is 
additionally controlled for), and those with upper secondary school degree earn 54-73% more 
(30-37%). Taken together, these results suggest that school track choice is a vital decision 
taken quite early in life. 
 
Table 1 – School track choice and highest school leaving certificate in West Germany 
  Highest school leaving certificate at age 21 






















Gymnasium  66.22  4.25  13.05  1.40  0.00  11.50  3.58 
Realschule  15.80  4.72  60.56  8.86  1.11  7.80  1.15 
Hauptschule  1.39  3.94  18.72  67.23  0.50  8.23  0.00 
Note: Table provides proportion of individuals (in %) holding a certain school degree at age 21 after having 
attended one of three school tracks at age 14. 
1) Upper secondary school degree (Abitur) is the official university 
entrance level. 
2) Degree from commercial or technical high school (Fachhochschulreife) is partly comparable to 
upper secondary school degree but provides only limited access to university. 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. 
 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
In the empirical analysis, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
2 
The GSOEP is a representative longitudinal study of private households in Germany (see 
HAISKEN-DENEW and FRICK (2003)) and spans the years 1984 to 2005. It collects information 
on households and individuals. Individual information is available for all household members 
older  than  16  years  of  age.  The  information  includes  household  socio-demographic 
composition, occupational biographies, employment, income and earnings, among others. For 
children,  the  household  head  provides  some  individual  information,  e.g.  on  school  track 
attendance. Our analysis is mainly based on a West German sample using information from 
GSOEP samples A and B. This West German sample provides information on income also 
during early childhood. For comparison we additionally use a sample for reunified Germany 
which is based on GSOEP samples A to E. Income histories for this sample are much shorter, 
ranging back to 1992 at most.  
                                                 
2 The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v1.0 (Oct 2006) for Stata. 
PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The following authors supplied 
PanelWhiz SOEP Plugins used to ensure longitudinal consistency, John P. Haisken-DeNew (12), Markus Hahn 
and John P. Haisken-DeNew (22). The PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the SOEP data used here and 
any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own. 
HAISKEN-DENEW and HAHN (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.   - 6 - 
 
Central  to  our  analysis  is  the  calculation  of  income.  We  define  three  different  income 
measures in order to check the sensitivity of our results: net household income, equivalent 
household  income,  and  an  indicator  for  living  in  relative  poverty.  Net  household  income 
includes labour income and income from self-employment, asset income, income from private 
and public transfers, and pension income. From these we subtract tax payments and social 
security  contributions.  In  essence,  this  refers  to  the  total  money  income  available  to  the 
household after taxes and social transfers, given in real terms (year 2000 euros). Our second 
measure accounts for economies of scale by using the square root of the number of household 
members as the equivalence scale. Finally, a child is defined as living in relative poverty if the 
household has less than 50% of the prevailing median equivalent income in the population. 
Apart from income we control for several other factors that might influence track choice, 
including the gender of the child, an indicator for firstborn children, the number of siblings 
living in the household when the child is age 14, mother's age and age squared, an indicator 
for children living in households with a foreign household head, indicators for the size of 
town, year dummies that are supposed to reflect trends in track choice over time, dummies for 
Länder that are supposed to reflect differences in regional school regulations, and a set of 
indicators  for  the  education  of  the  parents.  We  control  for  mother's  and  father's  highest 
schooling degrees and their highest vocational degrees. There is also an indicator for whether 
mother's/father's educational information is missing, which is equal to one if the respective 
parent did not respond or if the parent is missing altogether (e.g. in single parent households). 
Summary statistics for these variables are provided in the appendix in the left half of table 
A.1.  
 
In the case at hand, we analyze school attendance at age 14 and use information on children 
attending Hauptschule, Realschule, or Gymnasium. Children attending other schools are left 
out  of  the  analysis.  We  focus  on  14  year-old  children  for  several  reasons.  First,  not  all 
children have switched to secondary school track at an earlier age, because of differences in 
the timing of sorting between Länder, possible repetition of classes during primary school, or 
delayed entry to primary school. Furthermore, since schooling is compulsory until age 16 at 
least, all children are still within the schooling system. Second, because this choice fosters 
comparability across studies; most existing studies on track choice focus on children aged 14. 
Finally,  the  number  of  observations  in  the  GSOEP,  where  information  on  school  track 
attendance is available, is smaller for children at younger ages. 
 
Overall, there are 3,670 observations on 14 year-old children in the West German sample 
(4,876 in the sample using data for reunified Germany from 1992 on). For 2,959 (3,879) of 
these, we know whether they attend Hauptschule, Realschule, or Gymnasium. In the West 
German sample we lose one (453) observation, because information on the parents is missing, 
or sample weights are zero. Complete information on income at age 10 is available for 2,159 
(2,115) observations, at age 7 to 10 for 1,620 (1,172) observations and at age 3 to 6 for 1,159 
(542) observations. For each child GSOEP provides identification numbers of the mother and 
the spouse/partner of the mother. We use mother's identification number in order to identify 
siblings.  
 
Several different types of econometric models might be applied to analyze track choice. All 
models have in common that the observable choice  y  of one of the discrete outcomes is 
based on an unobservable underlying latent variable 
* y  which represents the propensity to 
select the track of interest. A quite straightforward model is the ordered logit/probit model, 
which has been used, for example, by JENKINS and SCHLUTER (2002). Assume that the latent   - 7 - 
variable of child i is influenced by parental and child characteristics  i x  and an error term  i u , 
i.e., 
* '
i i i y x u b = + . The child (or his parents) will choose outcome k if 
*
i y  exceeds a certain 
threshold  k m   but  is  smaller  than  the  next  higher  threshold  1 k m + ,  i.e.  the  probability  for 
choosing outcome k is 
' '
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) i k i k i P y k F x F x m b m b + = = - - - , with  () F ×  representing the 
cumulative distribution function of the error term. In our analysis we will use the logistic 
distribution.  
 
A related model is the generalized ordered logit model which relaxes the assumption put on 
b , namely to be independent of the actual outcome (see WILLIAMS (2006), who also provides 
an estimator for Stata). This so-called 'proportional odds/parallel lines' assumption is violated, 
if for example the effect of living in a large town (relative to the baseline, a small town) on 
attendance of highest track compared with the effect of living in a medium-sized town is not 
proportional to the two effects on attendance of lowest track. In the generalized ordered logit 
model the coefficients are choice-specific ( k b ) and the probability for choosing outcome k is 
' '
1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) i k i k k i k P y k F x F x m b m b + + = = - - - .  The  generalized  ordered  logit  model  can  be 
approximated by splitting up the outcome into K-1 binary outcomes 
k
i y % , indicating whether 
individual i has chosen outcome k or higher versus an outcome lower than k. The probability 
for choosing at least outcome k is 
' ( 1) ( )   2,...,
k
i k i k P y F x k K m b = = - " = % . This strategy has 
been  followed,  for  example,  by  BÜCHEL  ET  AL.  (2001),  who  analyze  attendance  of 
Gymnasium  (versus  attendance  of  Realschule  or  Hauptschule).  They,  however,  do  not 
consider  the  second  outcome,  i.e.  attendance  of  at  least  Realschule  versus  attending 
Hauptschule.  
 
The most important strength of these redefined binary outcomes is that they are suitable for 
estimating sibling fixed effects models, namely the conditional fixed effects logit model. The 
main advantage of these models is that they allow to control for unobserved time invariant 
parental  characteristics.  A  weakness  of  these  models  is  that  they  can  only  identify  the 
parameters using those observations, where the outcome variable differs between siblings. 
Fixed effects logit models have been used, for example, by FRANCESCONI ET AL. (2006), who 
analyze the effect of single parenthood on school track choice.  
 
If  one  is  not  willing  to  accept  the  assumption  that  track  choice  is  an  inherently  ordered 
outcome,  one  can  alternatively  use  the  multinomial  logit  model.  This  has  been  done  by 
SCHNEIDER (2004). We however do not consider the multinomial logit, because we believe 
that there is an inherent order in track  choice as required learning potential of the child, 
rewarded  prestige  and  future  earnings  perspectives  clearly  increase  from  Hauptschule  to 
Realschule and further to Gymnasium. Instead, we present results obtained by estimating the 






Taking a first look at school track choices (table 2), we find that 39% of children of West 
German birth cohorts 1973 to 1991 attended the highest school track (Gymnasium) when they 
were age 14, 31% attended the intermediate track (Realschule) and 30% the lowest track 
(Hauptschule).  Among  children  living  in  poor  households  at  age  10,  however,  only  16% 
attended  Gymnasium,  while  more  than  half  attended  Hauptschule.  In  the  following  we   - 8 - 
analyze whether household income has a causal effect on track choice. First we present results 
of several ordered logit models controlling for a core set of observable individual and parental 
characteristics. Since any correlation between income and school track choice observed in 
these models might be due to either a causal effect of income on school choice or unobserved 
differences in child or household characteristics, which are both associated with differences in 
income and school choice, we then present results for our siblings sample. Track choice of 
siblings is analyzed using conditional fixed effects logit models. Finally, we use information 
on  a  natural  experiment  which  took  place  in  1996,  when  child  benefits  were  increased 
considerably. This latter analysis is based on comparing track choice before and after the 
increase in child benefits. 
 
Table 2 – School track attendance at age 14 in West Germany 
School track at age 14  Overall
  Non-poor at age 10  Poor at age 10 
Gymnasium   38.96  40.37  16.26 
Realschule   31.03  31.28  27.06 
Hauptschule   30.00  28.36  56.69 
Note: Table provides weighted shares (in %) of West German children attending one of three secondary school 
tracks. The sample excludes those children who attend any other type of secondary school, e.g. comprehensive 
school.  Poverty  is  defined  as  having  less  than  50%  of  contemporaneous  West  German  median  equivalent 
household income.  
 
 
Ordered Logit Models 
In the first part of this section we present results of several ordered logit models using all 
three income measures mentioned above. Table 3 presents results for a set of specifications 
using several poverty indicators. These indicators measure poverty at different points in time: 
(i) we use an indicator for having been poor at age 10, the year when the decision on track 
choice is generally taken, (ii) an indicator for ever having been poor while the child was 7 to 
10 years old, i.e. during primary school, (iii) the number of years having been poor during 
primary school, (iv) an indicator for ever having been poor while the child was 3 to 6 years 
old, and (v) the number of years having been poor during this period. In table 3, we present 
the coefficients of the poverty indicators as well as the marginal effects of switching from a 
poor to a non-poor household on each of the probabilities to attend a specific track. This 
marginal effect is estimated for a reference child.
3  
 
As can be seen in table 3, all coefficients are negative and significant at the 5%-level or at 
least the 10%-level. This indicates that, even after controlling for a whole set of other parental 
background factors, poor children choose lower tracks significantly more often.
4 Compared to 
children who experienced poverty, the probability of choosing Gymnasium increases by an 
impressing  12  percentage  points  if  a  child  has never  experienced  poverty  during  primary 
school, while the probabilities to choose one of the other tracks decrease by 6 percentage 
points each. Comparing the point estimates of the coefficients of all specifications, it seems 
                                                 
3 Our reference child is a girl, who has one more sibling, but is the firstborn child, who is living in a non-
foreigner household, in a small town in Baden-Württemberg, in the year 2005, who has a mother age 41 and has 
parents who both attended Realschule and completed an apprenticeship. 
4 The effects associated with the other control factors used in the equations are not shown in the tables and can 
be obtained upon request. In all specifications we find that schooling and vocational attainment of the parents 
show a strong correlation with children's track choice, with children of better educated parents attending higher 
tracks. This confirms findings of most previous studies. Furthermore we find that the number of siblings in the 
household  has  no  influence  on  track  choice,  which  is  in  line  with  findings  of  BAUER  and  GANG  (2001). 
However, birth sequence seems to be important; firstborn children generally attend higher school tracks than 
their siblings. Also, girls are generally more likely to visit higher tracks than boys. These effects do hardly differ 
between the specifications, independent of which income measure or poverty indicator is used.   - 9 - 
that poverty in early childhood might be more important, i.e. has a larger effect, than poverty 
in later childhood. Yet, the difference between the point estimates does not appear to be 
significant from a statistical perspective and, if we control for both, poverty during primary 
school  and  in  the  time  before,  we  do  not  find  that  poverty  during  earlier  times  is  more 
important (see table A.2). 
 
Table 3 – Ordered logit results for different poverty indicators (West Germany) 
  Poor at age 10  Ever poor  
age 7 to 10 
Years poor  
age 7 to 10 
Ever poor  
age 3 to 6 
Years poor  
age 3 to 6 
  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. error 
Poverty indicator  -0.504  0.269  -0.485  0.237  -0.225  0.133  -0.667  0.267  -0.458  0.143 
Observations  2159  1620  1620  1159  1159 
  Marginal effect  Marginal effect  Marginal effect  Marginal effect  Marginal effect 
P(Hauptschule)  -5.57  -6.28  -2.71  -7.57  -5.01 
P(Realschule)  -6.94  -5.75  -2.91  -8.91  -6.38 
P(Gymnasium)  12.52  12.03  5.62  16.48  11.39 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface indicate statistical significance at 5%-level. The marginal effect is the effect of switching from poor to 
non-poor for a reference child (see footnote 3). Specifications include core set of control factors as described in 
section 3. 
 
Results for equivalent income measured at different points in time are presented in table 4. 
Experimenting with several specifications using income and its square and income interacted 
with an indicator for above median income as explanatory variables, we find that income 
squared  and  the  interaction  term,  respectively,  are  insignificant  in  all  specifications.
5 
Therefore we present results for linear specifications only. The marginal effects are provided 
for  an  increase  of  equivalent  household  income  from  6,000  euros,  which  is  close  to  the 
average annual equivalent household income of a poor household, to 7,200 euros, i.e. by 20%. 
The coefficient of the income variable is positive in all three specifications and larger for 
those income measures taken earlier during childhood. Increasing average income by 20% 
during  primary  school  is  associated  with  an  increased  attendance  of  Gymnasium  of 
approximately 2 percentage points and a reduction in the attendance of Hauptschule of almost 
equal size. This marginal effect seems to be considerably smaller than the one observed for 
switching from poverty to non-poverty. However, in comparing these marginal effects, one 
has to take into account that the average equivalent income of a non-poor household is 2.8 
times the income of a poor household, i.e. the switch from poor to non-poor is associated with 
nine times an income increase by 20%. Thus the marginal effects observed for both income 
measures are not too different from one another.  
 
Since there are hardly any differences between the estimation results when using equivalent 
household  income  compared  to  using  net  household  income  instead,  the  latter  are  not 
discussed (for results see table A.3). In addition to these basic ordered logit models we also 
estimated generalized ordered logit models. Results from these models are very similar to 
those of the basic model and, hence, are not present either.
6 Tests for the hypothesis that  k b  is 
the same for all tracks k are not rejected for most of the control factors, including the income 
measures. We find that only some of the Länder dummies, the indicator for firstborn child, 
and  the  indicator  for  mother  with  university  degree  are  track-specific  in  some  of  the 
                                                 
5 This is in line with JENKINS and SCHLUTER (2002), who report that the effect of income is linear instead of non-
liner. However, findings by BÜCHEL ET AL. (2001) and SCHNEIDER (2004) are different on this specific aspect. 
6 Results are available from the authors upon request.   - 10 - 
specifications.  Overall,  results  for  reunified  Germany  are  quite  similar  to  those  for  West 
Germany (see table A.4). 
 
Table 4 – Ordered logit results for different measures of equivalent income (West Germany) 
  Income at age 10  Average annual income at 
age 7 to 10 
Average annual income at  
age 3 to 6 
  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error 
Equivalent income
1)   0.051  0.015  0.079  0.014  0.102  0.020 
Observations  2159  1620  1159 
  Marginal effect  Marginal effect  Marginal effect 
P(Hauptschule)  -0.95  -1.88  -2.18 
P(Realschule)  -0.48  -0.08  -0.35 
P(Gymnasium)  1.43  1.96  2.53 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface indicate statistical significance at 5%-level. The marginal effect is the effect of increasing equivalent 
income by 20% (from 6,000 to 7,200 euros) for a reference child (see footnote 3). Specifications include core set 
of control factors as described in section 3. 
1) Per thousand euros. 
 
Taken together, we find that having more income or being non-poor is positively associated 
with higher school track choice and that results are very robust, i.e. are independent of the 
income  measure  or  estimation  method  used.  Whether  these  associations  represent  causal 
effects of income on track choice is analyzed in the next two parts of this section. 
 
 
Sibling Fixed Effects Models 
In the second part of this section we present results of sibling fixed effects models. Sibling 
fixed effects models assume that unobserved parental characteristics, such as motivation or 
ability, do not change over time and affect all siblings equally. In comparing the outcomes of 
siblings, these unobserved factors cancel out removing potential omitted variable bias of the 
estimated effects of the observed factors. In our specifications, these observed factors are 
mainly changes in household income and poverty status that took place between the track 
choice of one sibling and the track choice of another sibling. Furthermore we account for 
differences in gender, birth sequence, mother's age and size of town. 
 
Sibling comparisons have been criticized because income often changes slowly; differences 
between  siblings  might  therefore  be  small.  In  addition,  measurement  error  in  the  income 
variables may lead to an attenuation bias. Table A.5 however provides evidence that in our 
sample income changes quite considerably. While only 9% of siblings experience different 
poverty states when they are age 10, the mean absolute difference in equivalent income is 
more  than  4,000  euros  (median  3,105  euros)  and  the  mean  absolute  difference  in  net 
household income is 10,000 euros (median 7,117 euros). Furthermore, sibling samples have 
been criticized for being selective. At least, they only identify the effect of interest using those 
observations of households with at least two children where outcomes differ between siblings. 
Table A.1 juxtaposes means of our control factors in the siblings and the entire West German 
sample. The last column provides the differences between means in percent. We find that 
children in the siblings sample are somewhat less likely to attend Gymnasium and more likely 
to attend Realschule, their mothers and fathers generally hold lower schooling and vocational 
degrees than in the entire sample, and reside in medium-sized towns less often. Yet, this 
should not challenge our findings, if the assumption holds that the effect of income is equal 
for all children and independent of other household characteristics, an  assumption, which 
generally is also imposed in those models used for analyzing outcomes in the entire sample. 
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Tables 5 and 6 present results for the sibling fixed effects models for specifications using 
poverty indicators and equivalent income. Results for net household income are reported in 
table A.6. All tables present results for two outcomes. The first outcome indicates whether the 
child attends Gymnasium (vs. Realschule or Hauptschule) and the second whether it attends at 
least Realschule (i.e. Gymnasium or Realschule vs. Hauptschule). We find that attendance of 
Gymnasium is not affected by income or poverty status on a significant level in any of the 
specifications.  This  indicates  that  the  choice  of  highest  track  is  independent  of  financial 
endowments of the household and that those findings presented in the first part of this section 
are probably biased due to unobservable factors that differ between rich and poor households. 
For attendance of at least Realschule, however, results are less clear. While we do not find 
any  significant  effects  using  the  poverty  indicators,  we  find  negative  effects  if  using 
equivalent income or net household income. These negative effects imply that siblings are 
more likely to choose the lowest track, i.e. Hauptschule, if household income is higher when 
they are age 10 or during primary school.
7 In our sample that uses observations for reunified 
Germany, none of the fixed effects estimates is significant (see table A.7). 
 
Table 5 – Sibling fixed-effects results for different poverty indicators (West Germany)  
  Poor at age 10  Ever poor  
age 7 to 10 
Years poor  
age 7 to 10 
Ever poor  
age 3 to 6 
Years poor  
age 3 to 6 
  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. error 
  Attendance of Gymnasium (vs. Realschule or Hauptschule) 
Poverty indicator  0.590  0.636  -0.759  0.729  -0.653  0.495  -0.581  0.885  -0.197  0.525 
Observations  322  233  233  160  160 
  Attendance of Gymnasium or Realschule (vs. Hauptschule) 
Poverty indicator  0.554  0.575  -0.135  0.468  -0.082  0.276  -0.541  0.621  0.092  0.419 
Observations  377  268  268  152  152 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface  indicate  statistical  significance  at  5%-level.  Specifications  also  control  for  gender,  birth  sequence, 
mother's age and size of town. 
 
Table 6 – Sibling  fixed-effects results for different measures of equivalent income (West 
Germany)  
  Income at age 10  Average annual income at 
age 7 to 10 
Average annual income at  
age 3 to 6 
  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error 
  Attendance of Gymnasium (vs. Realschule or Hauptschule) 
Equivalent income
1)   0.002  0.032  -0.009  0.054  -0.038  0.052 
Observations  322  233  160 
  Attendance of Gymnasium or Realschule (vs. Hauptschule) 
Equivalent income
1)   -0.072  0.036  -0.239  0.093  0.006  0.064 
Observations  377  268  152 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface  indicate  statistical  significance  at  5%-level.  Specifications  also  control  for  gender,  birth  sequence, 
mother's age and size of town. 




In the third part of this section we use information on a natural experiment which took place 
in  1996,  when  child  benefits  were  raised  considerably.  In  Germany  child  benefits 
                                                 
7 Concerning the other factors included in the fixed effects models, we find that only gender has a significant 
influence on track choice in most of the specifications. Girls generally choose higher school tracks.   - 12 - 
(Kindergeld) have been paid since 1954. Parents receive a fixed amount of benefit each month 
for every child below age 18 and for children aged 19 to 27 if these children remain in school 
or receive vocational or university education. During the first half of the 1990s monthly child 
benefits were 70 DM
8 for the first child, 130 DM for the second, 220 DM for the third and 
240 DM for each additional child. In 1996, child benefits were increased considerably due to 
an intervention of the federal constitutional court. The court had decided in September 1992 
that child benefits were too low. In 1996, child benefits were raised to 200 DM for the first 
and the second child, 300 DM for the third and 350 DM for each additional child. Hence, the 
increase in benefits was more than 180% for the first child, leading to an additional annual 
amount of 1,560 DM (800 euros) for a family with one child. For the second and any further 
child the increases were somewhat lower (54% and less) but still sizable. This change in child 
benefit  regulations  led  to  a  permanent  increase  in  household  income  by  a  considerable 
amount. Especially for low income households, the increase was quite high in comparison to 
annual income. Furthermore, this change or at least the size of the increase was unanticipated 
by most households, because the German parliament did not decide on the changes before 
September 1995. We consider this change a natural experiment and analyze whether track 
choice differs between children who made their choice before and after the reform of the child 
benefit regulations.  
 
Table  7  presents  results  for  several  specifications  using  different  control  and  treatment 
groups.  In the first column we compare children leaving primary school in 1995 (control 
group) with those leaving in 1996 (treatment group), in the second column we use those 
leaving  in  1994  or  1995  as  control  and  those  leaving  in  1996  or  1997  as  treated.  The 
remaining comparisons gradually extend the control and treatment groups by one cohort each. 
If  we  do  not  control  for  child  and  household  characteristics,  the  effect  of  the  reform  is 
insignificant for all comparisons (upper part of table 7). If we additionally account for our 
core set of control factors, the results are somewhat striking (lower part of table 7). The closer 
treatment  and  control  groups  are,  in  terms  of  time,  the  larger  is  the  effect.  With  every 
additional  cohort  included  in  the  comparison,  the  effect  becomes  smaller.
9  Generally,  the 
effect of higher benefits on track choice is positive, i.e. children are more likely to choose 
higher tracks after the reform. However, the effect is significant only in two specifications, 
when  primary  school  leaving  cohorts  1994-1997  and  1993-1998  are  compared,  and 
approaches zero if more distant cohorts are included. The picture is quite similar if we do not 
only focus on children in West Germany but on all children living in reunified Germany. 
Table A.8 in the appendix shows that the point estimate of the effect is larger for closer 
cohorts and even becomes negative if more distant cohorts are included. In these comparisons 
for  reunified  Germany,  however,  none  of  the  effects  is  significantly  different  from  zero. 
Results not displayed in the tables show that the findings for West Germany are entirely 
driven  by  track  choices  of  children  in  households  with  above  median  income.  For  all 
comparisons, the effect of the reform is insignificant for children in households with below 
medium income, whereas it is significantly positive in the first three comparisons of the West 
German sample for children in households with above medium income. 
 
We take this as evidence that the reform, and thus the additional income, had no effect on 
school track choice, at least not over a prolonged period and especially not for individuals at 
the lower end of the income distribution. At best, there is an effect in the first two to three 
years after the reform for high income households, which might indicate that people were still 
surprised  and  did  not  fully  integrate  the  extra  amount  of  income  into  their  spending  and 
                                                 
8 The official exchange rate for the conversion of DM to Euro fixed in 1998 is 1.956 DM/Euro. 
9 Results are qualitatively identical, if we hold constant the control group (cohorts 1994 and 1995) and only 
extend the treatment group by including additional cohorts.   - 13 - 
consumption behaviour. Instead, it might have been used for long-term investments in their 
children. After this initial surprise, however, track choice behaviour became very similar to 
how  it  was  before  the  reform.  Given  that  the  relative  increase  in  household  income 
experienced by households with above median income was much lower than for households 
with below median income, it is quite plausible, however, that changes in school track choice 
of  high  income  households  might  be  driven  by  other  reasons  than  the  increase  in  child 
benefits, e.g. changes in preferences for higher school tracks. 
 
Table 7 – Ordered logit results for natural experiment (West Germany)  
  1995  1994-1995  1993-1995  1992-1995  1991-1995  1990-1995 
  vs.  vs.  vs.  vs.  vs.  vs. 
  1996  1996-1997  1996-1998  1996-1999  1996-2000  1996-2001 
  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error 
  Specifications without other control factors 
After reform  0.149  0.421  0.090  0.296  0.174  0.225  0.135  0.197  0.147  0.169  0.183  0.153 
  Specifications with further control factors
1) 
After reform  0.649  0.528  0.568  0.289  0.458  0.229  0.161  0.203  0.047  0.180  0.005  0.157 
Observations  203  410  641  849  1095  1339 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface  indicate  statistical  significance  at  5%-level. 
1)  Specifications  include  core  set  of  control  factors  as 





The  German  schooling  system  selects  children  into  different  secondary  school  tracks 
generally directly after leaving primary school. Since approximately two thirds of the children 
do not change school tracks after age 14 and the final schooling degree is highly correlated 
with  subsequent  choices  regarding  the  occupational  or  academic  career  and  other  labour 
market outcomes like wages, school track choice is a vital decision taken quite early in life. 
Earlier  studies  have  shown  that  track  choice  is  highly  correlated  with  household  income. 
Children from less wealthy households generally choose lower tracks. Our analysis shows 
that this association remains significant, even if we control for further information on parental 
background. However, these associations might be due either to a causal effect of income on 
school choice or to differences in child or household characteristics which both are associated 
with differences in income and school choice.  
 
In order to identify the causal effect we compare outcomes of siblings which experienced 
different income situations when switching to secondary school. These sibling comparisons 
suggest that income has no causal effect on choosing the highest track (Gymnasium). For 
lower tracks, there is even some indication of income having a negative effect, i.e. sibling 
raised during more affluent times are more likely to choose the lowest track (Hauptschule) 
than to choose the intermediate track (Realschule). In addition to these sibling differences we 
use  information  on  a  natural  experiment  that  took  place  in  1996,  when  child  benefits 
increased considerably. Comparing children who switched from primary to secondary school 
before and after the reform, we find that the reform had no effect on school track choice, at 
least not over a prolonged period. Overall, these findings suggest that income has no positive 
causal effect on school choice and that differences between high- and low-income households 
are predominantly driven by unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. differences in ability, motivation 
or preferences. At least, this holds for differences in family income experienced when the 
child was aged 3 to 10 years. Due to small sample size, we are not able to extend our analysis   - 14 - 
to account for income differences experienced during the first or second year after birth. Thus, 
we are not yet able to rule out that income has an impact on track choice or, more broadly, on 
cognitive  skills  during  these  early  years  (for  empirical  evidence  on  sensitive  periods  for 
certain investments, see CUNHA ET AL. (2005)).  
 
For policy makers these results imply that they should not focus on financial transfers to 
families with children that are in need. Instead, more promising interventions might be those 
that focus on compensating differences in motivation and parenting quality. Experimental 
studies show that additional classroom sessions, teacher visits at home, and other supportive 
interventions have a powerful influence on the development of cognitive and social skills (for 
a  summary  on  findings  from  different  disciplines  see  KNUDSEN  ET  AL.  (2006)).  These 
interventions  should  start  already  early  in  life  and  might  help  to  improve  the  level  of 
intergenerational  mobility,  i.e.  to  lower  the  degree  of  transmission  of  income,  poverty  or 
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Appendix – Additional Tables 
 
Table A.1 – Descriptive statistics for West German sample 
Variable  Mean 





Information on the child       
Attends Gymnasium  0.3896  0.3069  -21.24 
…Realschule  0.3103  0.3954  27.42 
…Hauptschule  0.3000  0.2977  -0.78 
Girl  0.4988  0.5009  0.42 
Firstborn child  0.4765  0.3119  -34.55 
Information on the household       
Number of siblings  1.99  2.37  19.05 
Foreign household  0.1533  0.1638  6.91 
Size of town small (<20,000 inhabitants)  0.4499  0.5127  13.97 
…medium (20,000-100,000 inhabitants)  0.2969  0.2136  -28.06 
…large (>100,000 inhabitants)  0.2532  0.2736  8.09 
Information on the mother       
Mother's age  41.45  41.32  -0.32 
Mother holds no school degree   0.0504  0.0563  11.76 
…general secondary degree  0.4191  0.4136  -1.31 
…intermediate degree  0.2786  0.3419  22.70 
…upper secondary degree or technical school degree  0.1558  0.0902  -42.13 
…missing  0.0961  0.0980  2.02 
Mother holds no vocational degree  0.2659  0.2717  2.19 
…completed an apprenticeship  0.5948  0.6431  8.12 
…holds university degree  0.1098  0.0739  -32.63 
…missing  0.0295  0.0113  -61.89 
Information on the father       
Father holds no school degree   0.0306  0.0271  -11.52 
…general secondary degree  0.3649  0.3983  9.16 
…intermediate degree  0.1471  0.1795  22.02 
…upper secondary degree or technical school degree  0.1939  0.1451  -25.18 
...missing  0.2635  0.2500  -5.10 
Father holds no vocational degree  0.1237  0.1344  8.66 
…completed an apprenticeship  0.5257  0.6185  17.66 
…holds university degree  0.1853  0.1148  -38.08 
…missing  0.1653  0.1323  -19.94 
# Observations  2159  582   
Note: Based on West German sample for those children where information is available on poverty status at age 
10. 
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Table A.2 – Ordered logit results for income measured in two periods (West Germany)  
  Ever poor  Years poor  Average equivalent 
income
1) 
Average net household 
income
1) 
  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error 
At age 7 to 10  -0.777  0.304  -0.364  0.167  0.063  0.028  0.029  0.012 
At age 3 to 6  -0.533  0.274  -0.342  0.156  0.049  0.032  0.019  0.013 
Observations  1059  1059  1059  1059 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface  indicate  statistical  significance  at  5%-level.  Specifications  include  core  set  of  control  factors  as 
described in section 3 and two income measures taken during primary school and while the child was 3 to 6 years 
old. 
1) Per thousand euros. 
 
 
Table  A.3  –  Ordered  logit  results  for  different  measures  of  net  household  income  (West 
Germany)  
  Income at age 10  Average annual income at 
age 7 to 10 
Average annual income at 
age 3 to 6 
  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error 
Net household income
1)  0.022  0.006  0.033  0.006  0.043  0.008 
Observations  2159  1620  1159 
  Marginal effect  Marginal effect  Marginal effect 
P(Hauptschule)  -0.79  -1.46  -1.66 
P(Realschule)  -0.50  -0.30  -0.63 
P(Gymnasium)  1.29  1.75  2.28 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface  indicate  statistical  significance  at  5%-level.  The  marginal  effect  is  the  effect  of  increasing  net 
household income by 20% (from 12,000 to 14,400 euros) for a reference child (see footnote 3). Specifications 
include core set of control factors as described in section 3. 
1) Per thousand euros. 
 
 
Table A.4 – Ordered logit results for different measures of income (reunified Germany) 
  Poor at age 10  Ever poor  
age 7 to 10 
Years poor  
age 7 to 10 
Equivalent 
income at age 10
1) 
Average equiv. 
annual income at 
age 7 to 10
1) 
  Coef.  Std. error Coef.  Std. error Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. error
Income measure  0.122  0.322  -0.454  0.299  -0.291  0.154  0.044  0.014  0.081  0.019 
Observations  2115  1172  1172  2115  1172 
  Marginal effect  Marginal effect  Marginal effect  Marginal effect  Marginal effect 
P(Hauptschule)  0.96  -2.55  -1.54  -0.68  -0.96 
P(Realschule)  2.05  -8.18  -5.26  -0.58  -1.42 
P(Gymnasium)  -3.01  10.73  6.79  1.26  2.38 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface indicate statistical significance at 5%-level. The marginal effect is the effect of switching from poor to 
non-poor or for increasing equivalent income from 6,000 to 7,200 euros for a reference child (see footnote 2). 
Specifications include core set of control factors as described in section 3. 
1) Per thousand euros. 
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Table A.5 – Descriptive statistics on income differences between siblings at age 10 (West 
Germany) 
  Average absolute difference between siblings 
  Mean difference  Std. error 
Poor at age 10  0.0851  0.2796 
Equivalent income at age 10  4374.76  5018.61 
Net household income at age 10  9997.64  11210.74 
# siblings  582 
# households  235 
Note: Based on West German sample for those siblings with information on poverty status at age 10, which differ 
in school track choice. 
 
 
Table  A.6  –  Sibling  fixed-effects  results  for  different  measures  of  net  household  income 
(West Germany) 
  Income at age 10  Average annual income at 
age 7 to 10 
Average annual income at 
age 3 to 6 
  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error  Coef.  Std. error 
  Attendance of Gymnasium (vs. Realschule or Hauptschule) 
Net household income
1)  -0.002  0.014  -0.010  0.023  -0.014  0.025 
Observations  322  233  160 
  Attendance of Gymnasium or Realschule (vs. Hauptschule) 
Net household income
1)  -0.038  0.016  -0.103  0.039  0.008  0.031 
Observations  377  268  152 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface  indicate  statistical  significance  at  5%-level.  Specifications  also  control  for  gender,  birth  sequence, 
mother's age and size of town. 
1) Per thousand euros. 
 
 
Table  A.7  –  Sibling  fixed-effects  results  for  different  measures  of  income  (reunified 
Germany)  
  Poor at age 10  Ever poor  
age 7 to 10 
Years poor  
age 7 to 10 
Equivalent 
income at age 10
1) 
Average equiv. 
annual income at 
age 7 to 10
1) 
  Coef.  Std. error Coef.  Std. error Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. error
  Attendance of Gymnasium (vs. Realschule or Hauptschule) 
Income measure  -0.755  1.259  -15.651 3317.905  0.286  1.629  -0.042  0.055  -0.178  0.137 
Observations  246  111  111  246  111 
  Attendance of Gymnasium or Realschule (vs. Hauptschule) 
Poverty indicator  -0.671  1.244  1.059  1.103  0.631  0.775  -0.078  0.052  -0.059  0.111 
Observations  234  117  117  234  117 
Note:  Coefficients  printed  in  italics  indicate  marginal  significance  (10%-level),  and  coefficients  printed  in 
boldface  indicate  statistical  significance  at  5%-level.  Specifications  also  control  for  gender,  birth  sequence, 
mother's age and size of town. 
1) Per thousand euros. 
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Table A.8 – Ordered logit results for natural experiment (reunified Germany)  
  1995  1994-1995  1993-1995  1992-1995  1991-1995  1990-1995 
  vs.  vs.  vs.  vs.  vs.  vs. 
  1996  1996-1997  1996-1998  1996-1999  1996-2000  1996-2001 
  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error  Coef.  Std. 
error 
  Specifications without other control factors 
After reform  0.134  0.308  -0.114  0.201  -0.024  0.152  -0.031  0.131  0.030  0.113  0.077  0.103 
  Specifications with further control factors
1) 
After reform  0.400  0.300  0.043  0.194  0.022  0.153  -0.104  0.132  -0.068  0.119  -0.027  0.107 
Observations  416  952  1488  1991  2523  3019 
Note: Table presents results for several treatment and control groups leaving primary school in different years. 
Coefficients printed in italics indicate marginal significance (10%-level), and coefficients printed in boldface 
indicate statistical significance at 5%-level. 
1) Specifications include core set of control factors as described in 
section 3.  
 
 